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A main research goal within neuroscience is to explain the relation between neurophysiological
processes and conscious experiences. One approach involves focusing on problems such as the
integration of information, the deliberate control of behavior, the ability to discriminate and
categorize environmental stimuli, etc. These problems have been dubbed by philosophers as
“easy” to suggest that the present limitations hindering progress could be overcome by more
sophisticated methods in the near future (Chalmers, 1995, 1996). For example, explaining the
integration of information requires describing the neurophysiological mechanisms responsible for
information processing. Although these mechanisms are not currently well known, it is very likely
that neuroscience will be able to explain them in the near future. It has been argued, however, that
the problem of phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained by reference to such mechanisms
because it involves a special kind of subjective qualities, i.e., phenomenal qualities that are present
in experience (Dennett, 1991, 2003; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 1996; Revonsuo, 2006; Majeed, 2016).
For example, the experience of seeing a red patch has a different phenomenal quality (a redly quality
or “feel”) from the experience of seeing a green patch (a greenly quality or “feel”)1. The problem
of explaining how or why neurophysiological processing gives rise to phenomenal experiences has
been dubbed the “hard problem of consciousness” to suggest that solving it requires a paradigm
shift in neuroscience (Chalmers, 1995, 1996).
There are several theoretical frameworks which attempt to integrate brain and mind (Crick and
Koch, 1990, 2003; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Revonsuo, 2000, 2003; Baars, 2003; Zeki, 2003,
2004; Freeman, 2007). However, most of them attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness
through its neural correlates (Rees et al., 2002; Noë and Thompson, 2004). At the core of these
theoretical frameworks is the idea that by isolating the physical processes associated with conscious
experiences we can find comprehensive, systematic associations between them and characteristics
of conscious experience. According to one such theory, phenomenal consciousness arises from
a correspondence between the structural properties of the information processed in the brain
and structural properties of conscious experience (see for example, Kohler, 1947). According to
another such theory, consciousness arises from synchronized oscillations in the cerebral cortex
(Crick and Koch, 1995). However, these theories have several drawbacks (Fingelkurts et al., 2009).
Most notably, they rely on the relation of correlation, which is too weak to have any explanatory
power (Chalmers, 1997; Noë and Thompson, 2004; Revonsuo, 2006; Fingelkurts et al., 2009) or
postulate entities that cannot be easily measured scientifically (Revonsuo, 2000; Seth et al., 2008).
An alternative theoretical framework, known as Operational Architectonics, has recently been
proposed to explain phenomenal consciousness (Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2010). It does not reduce
phenomenal experience to the brain functions since it is believed that such a reduction would either
1The presence of an external stimulus is not necessary for having a conscious experience with a certain phenomenal quality;
hallucinating a pink elephant involves having a conscious experience with a certain phenomenal quality in the absence of a
sensory stimulus.
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distort or eliminate consciousness. Rather, it purports to establish
that the level of organization in the cortex is functionally
isomorphic to the phenomenal level of experience. In other
words, the phenomenological structure of consciousness
corresponds to the brain’s structure of operational architectonics
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001; Fingelkurts et al., 2010). On
this view, the cortical system can perform many operations,
involving large-scale local and global cortical networks,
characterized by different spatial and temporal parameters, using
one or more operational modules. These operational modules
are not directly connected with structural or static functional
modules in the brain. Rather, they have a dynamic nature–they
are metastable–and exist in their own operational space-time,
i.e., an abstract space and time the brain constructs each time an
operational module emerges (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001;
Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2010)2. These metastable brain states
underlie complex brain functions and corresponding conscious
complex operations such as cognitive percepts and mental states
that are representational in nature (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts,
2001).
Rapid advances in the field of neuroimaging
techniques including magnetoencephalography (MEG),
electroencephalography (EEG), functional MRI (fMRI),
diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), voxel based morphomentry
(VBM), and optical imaging, have allowed neuroscientists to
investigate neurophysiological processes in ways that have not
been possible until recently (Tehovnik et al., 2006; Bandettini,
2009). Combining these techniques with advanced analysis
procedures during different conditions such as hypnosis,
psychiatric and neurological conditions, subliminal stimulation,
and psychotropic drugs (Bhagwagar et al., 2006; Griffiths
et al., 2008; Studerus et al., 2011; Lee and Roth, 2012) began
transforming the study of neuroscience in ways that it is now
possible to test such frameworks, bringing us a step closer to
solving the hard problem of consciousness.
A study using a task-free functional MRI (fMRI) protocol
designed to capture the transition from normal waking
consciousness to the psychedelic state and blood-oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) fMRI to map cerebral blood flow and
changes in venous oxygenation before and after intravenous
infusions of placebo and psilocybin found that psilocybin
significantly decreases the positive coupling of medial prefrontal
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex (two key structural hubs)
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; see also Lee and Roth, 2012)3.
Although, the function of the posterior cingulate cortex is
not yet fully understood, its association with the default-mode
network regions (Raichle et al., 2001), known to host the
2Metastability initiates the hierarchical coupling between phenomenal and
neurophysiological states while simultaneously allowing them to retain their
individuality (Fingelkurts et al., 2009). It expresses the full complexity of a
system, accommodates heterogeneous elements, does not require disengagement
mechanisms in order for a system to switch to another state, and allows a system
to flexibly survey through a set of possibilities (see Kelso and Tognoli, 2007).
3For studies using varying neuroimaging techniques such as arterial
spin labeling (ASL), blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) measures,
magnetoencephalography (MEG), or electroencephalography (EEG) and varying
psychotropic substances such as LSD and ayahuasca (see Riba et al., 2002; Stuckey
et al., 2005; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016).
highest number of cortico-cortical connections in the brain,
suggests that it may play a role in conscious experience (Raichle,
1998; Gusnard et al., 2001) and may account for findings
indicating that functional decreases in activity in the posterior
cingulate cortex alter the conscious states of subjects under the
influence of psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; Wood et al.,
2012).
Neuroimaging techniques also indicate that psychotropic
drugs can modify the natural metastable organization of
brain activity (Fingelkurts et al., 2009). For example, a study
in which healthy subjects were administered lorazepam (a
benzodiazepine) showed that the number and strength of
functional cortical connections increased significantly. These
cortical changes were found to correspond to mental changes
such as slowing of thinking and cognition (Fingelkurts et al.,
2004). Such findings are consistent with the Operational
Architecture framework, which posits that changes at mental
level must be accompanied by corresponding changes in the
metastable organization of brain activity (Fingelkurts et al., 2009).
A number of studies using neuroimaging techniques have
also begun to examine the neural correlates of the phenomenal
characteristics associated with auditory hallucinations in
schizophrenic patients. Reduction in the prefrontal functional
connectivity was found in studies using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) on eight schizophrenia patients and 10
controls in schizophrenia suffering from auditory hallucinations
(Lawrie et al., 2002; see also Jardri et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2012).
Although, more studies are needed, schizophrenia can provide
an alternative approach to studying the functional connectivity
of the brain and its relation to the resulting altered phenomenal
states. For example, it is suggested that the altered phenomenal
states in schizophrenia may be the result of a disruption of
the metastable balance between large-scale integration and
independent processing in the cortex, leading to an excess of
local information expression by cortical areas (Bressler, 2003;
Fingelkurts et al., 2009). Such suggestions could be tested in
future studies.
The recent paradigm shift in neuroscience, which involves
testing competing theoretical frameworks using a combination
of neuroimaging techniques and advanced analysis procedures
during different conditions, may allow us to find an adequate
solution to the hard problem of consciousness. For example, the
Operational Architecture framework posits that every change in
themental level must be accompanied by a corresponding change
at the neurophysiological level (Fingelkurts et al., 2009). Unlike
other frameworks, which rely on the relation of correlation that is
too weak to have any explanatory power, this framework provides
scientifically plausible ways to investigate the hard problem of
consciousness. Different conditions such as psychotropic drugs,
hypnosis, and schizophrenia can be used to test the hypothesis
that mental changes must be accompanied by corresponding
changes at the neurophysiological level. At the same time,
neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI or EEG can be used
to test whether changes at the neurophysiological level involve
metastable changes between different functional operational
modules in the cortex. It should nevertheless be emphasized that
research on the hard problem of consciousness is currently in its
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infancy as a result of its perplexing nature. Although, the current
paradigm shift discussed here may better prepare researchers
to tackle the hard problem of consciousness, a considerable
amount of research is required in order to arrive at any firm
conclusions.
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